Financing Patterns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results by Hackethal, Andreas & Schmidt, Reinhard H.
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT
FRANKFURT AM MAIN
FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN
WORKING PAPER SERIES: FINANCE & ACCOUNTING
Andreas Hackethal/Reinhard H. Schmidt
Financing Patterns:
Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results
No.33
May 2000 
 
 
FINANCING PATTERNS: MEASUREMENT CONCEPTS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
by 
Andreas Hackethal and Reinhard H. Schmidt
* 
 
University of Frankfurt, Germany 
 
Abstract 
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic 
thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data 
instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal 
financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that therefore financial patterns do 
not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not 
at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being 
either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question 
the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the 
financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the 
prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side.  
 
The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by 
demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by Mayer et al. are due to a hidden 
assumption underlying their methodology. It then derives an alternative method of measuring 
financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. 
This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan 
and the United States. The empirical results are very much in line with the commonly held belief 
prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three 
countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way. 
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Introduction 
How is investment financed? Or, to put it another way, from where do corporations, and firms 
in general, obtain the funds they use for making real investments? If there are certain common 
features of firms in different countries with respect to this question, we speak of financing 
patterns. If they exist, financing patterns are an essential and characteristic element of the financial 
system of a country. There are several reasons why it would be interesting to know the prevailing 
financing patterns. A non-exhaustive list includes the following four reasons: 
-  Policymakers in a given country may want to understand how their national financial system 
functions if they wish to improve its functioning and thereby serve their national business 
community (Mayer, 1990; OECD, 1995). 
-  International policymakers need to understand how financial systems function and how firms 
are typically financed if they wish to assist in the introduction of a market-based financial 
infrastructure, as has been, and still is, a main task with respect to the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe and the NIS as well as many developing countries (Mayer, 1989).  
-  Financial economists want to be able to put microeconomic theories of finance to an empirical 
test using aggregate data (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997). 
-  Last but not least, financial managers may want to know how others fund investments because 
providers of funds might be more likely to accept as reasonable what they are used. Sticking to 
the conventional could lower the cost of capital to a given corporation and assure its liquidity. 
The capital structures of corporations in different countries have been a major research topic for 
many years.
1 There are substantial differences between the results obtained by the various studies 
which use balance sheet data; and mainly because of problems of methodology the results as a 
whole seem to be quite unreliable.
2 The work of Colin Mayer has led to a profound revision of 
academic thinking in this field, both in terms of methodology and in terms of results. Mayer and 
others who followed his line of research
3 use flow-of-funds data to analyze national financing 
patterns. Their general finding is that internal financing is by far the dominant mode of financing 
                                                             
1 Rutherford (1988) surveys older studies. More recent studies include Berglöf (1991), Aggarwal (1994) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995). 
2 Their main shortcomings are due to the distorting influence of different national accounting rules and conventions - a 
problem which is addressed with considerable acumen in Rajan and Zingales (1995) - and sampling problems, in 
particular a selection bias which is due to the fact that most studies use a data base inclding only large firms. However, 
in many countries the capital structure of large firms differs systematically from those of smaller firms.  
3 See Mayer (1988, 1990), Mayer and Alexander (1990), Bertero (1994), Edwards and Fischer (1994), Prowse (1995) 
and Corbett and Jenkinson (1996, 1997).   2
in all countries
4 and that, not least for this reason, financing patterns do not differ very much 
between countries. An even more interesting finding, however, is that those differences which still 
seem to exist are not at all consistent with the generally held belief that financial systems can be 
usefully classified as either bank- or capital market-dominated. This result is important not only 
because it challenges established views, but also because it leads to a research puzzle
5: There does 
not seem to be a correspondence between the financing pattern of corporations in a given country 
on the one side and the prevailing corporate governance system in that country on the other side - 
a correspondence which the theory of incomplete contracts would lead one to expect (La Porta  et 
al., 1997). In fact, one would expect the financing patterns to "fit" the governance systems in the 
sense that those to whom the governance system gives most power to influence the policies of the 
corporations would also be the main providers of funds, and there can hardly be a doubt that 
governance systems differ widely between countries. One possible explanation for this apparent 
inconsistency is that the empirical findings of Mayer  et al. might not actually support the 
interpretations of them which are often given. The present paper argues that this is indeed the case. 
In our paper we address what one could call the "Mayer puzzle" on methodological and 
empirical grounds. The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, empirical results of 
flow-of-funds studies in the spirit of Mayer (1988) are presented. We then demonstrate that the 
methodology used to derive these results is based on a specific assumption as to which sources of 
funds finance which uses of funds. It appears to us that, for answering the question "how is invest-
ment financed", this assumption is not warranted; nevertheless, it is responsible for the results.  
We propose an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which is as close as 
possible in its spirit to the Mayer et al. approach, but avoids the critical assumption. The new 
measurement concept is presented in section II and applied to Germany, the United States and 
Japan in section III. The empirical results which the alternative methodology yields turn out to be 
in line with expectations grounded in theory as well as with commonly held beliefs prior to 
Mayer’s influential contribution. Section IV interprets these results and briefly shows how they fit 
into the context of differences between financial systems in general and corporate governance 
systems in particular in order to show that the "Mayer puzzle" is resolved. Section V concludes. 
 
 
                                                             
4 This can be perceived as general evidence for the pecking order theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
5  See Schmidt and Tyrell (1997). Mayer's findings are also classified as an extremely stimulating puzzle and 
discussed at length in Mishkin (1998), chap. 9.   3
I  The flow-of-funds approach 
A  The methodology and the main results 
Among the studies of financing patterns in various countries that have followed in the tradition 
of Mayer, the most extensive to date are those by Jenny Corbett and Tim Jenkinson (1996, 1997). 
They ask the seemingly simple, and evidently important, question: "How is investment financed 
[in Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States]?"  To answer this question 
empirically, Corbett and Jenkinson use flow-of funds data for several reasons. Flow-of-funds data 
are more reliable than balance sheet data because they do not depend so much on accounting rules 
and conventions; they are more comprehensive because they cover all firms in an economy; and 
they are collected in ways which are largely comparable between countries. By definition, flow-
of-funds data capture only flows of funds from one economic sector to another; thus, intra-sectoral 
flows are almost entirely consolidated and thus eliminated. 
In their study, Corbett and Jenkinson employ net flows, and this in a double sense. The 
statistical offices report flow-of-funds data only after repayments have been netted out. For 
example, the figures for loan financing from banks in any given year result from subtracting all 
loan repayments by the nonfinancial enterprise sector from the total volume of loans from banks 
taken out by these very firms in the same year. Similarly, equity financing is calculated as the 
difference between the proceeds from issuing new shares and the expenses for redeeming 
outstanding shares, including the acquisition of shares in other companies, from the public. One 
could call this form of netting "repayment netting". The second step of netting consists in 
eliminating firms’ financial investments. For instance, net flows between banks and non-financial 
companies are the difference between the volume of (net) financing of firms by banks, e.g. in the 
form of bank loans, and firms’ financial investments with banks, e.g. in the form of bank deposits. 
One could call this second type of netting "balance sheet netting". The flows - thus netted twice - 
are then expressed as a fraction of total physical investment. Corbett and Jenkinson define the ratio 
of the net financing ij from any one source j of financing - namely internal funds, banks, bonds, 
equity, trade credit, capital transfers, and others - to aggregate investment as the contribution of 
source j to the financing of total investment in a five-year period. The formula they use is   
, where It represents the total amount of gross investment in plant, machinery and 
other fixed assets and net additions to working capital in year t. The summation over t serves the 
purpose of aggregating over a certain number of periods in order to eliminate business cycle   4
effects and other peculiarities of any given year. pt and qt are appropriately chosen price indices. 
Table I shows the Corbett and Jenkinson results. 
Table I: Net sources of finance in four countries 1970-1994 
Net Source of Finance  Germany  Japan  Great Britain  United States 
                                                                     In percent of physical investment (1970-1994) 
Internal  78.9  69.9  93.3  96.1 
Bank finance  11.9  26.7  14.6  11.1 
Bonds  -1.0  4.0  4.2  15.4 
New Equity  0.1  3.5  -4.6  -7.6 
Trade Credit  -1.2  -5.0  -0.9  -2.4 
Capital Transfers  8.7  -  1.7  - 
Other  1.4  1.0  0.0  -4.4 
Statistical adjustment  1.2  0.0  -8.4  -8.3 
Source: Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) 
These results do not differ in any important respect from those derived and published almost a 
decade earlier by Mayer, which have by now been accepted by many authors as a very important 
insight into the real financing patterns of firms.
6 As Mayer did at that time, Corbett and Jenkinson 
discuss the overwhelming importance of internal finance in all countries covered in their study, 
and also the finding that, compared with Germany, whose financial system is allegedly dominated 
by banks, bank financing in fact appears to be more important in the UK and almost equally 
important in the United States, even though the UK and the U.S. are commonly considered to have 
capital-market dominated financial systems; and they discuss the seemingly paradoxical result that 
equity financing is negligible everywhere and even negative in both the UK and the U.S. They 
summarize their findings by concluding that  
"[t]he celebrated distinction between the market based financial pattern of the United Kingdom 
and the United States and the bank-based pattern of Germany is inaccurate."(p. 85) 
                                                             
6 The phenomenon discussed in depth by Mayer et al. seems to be common knowledge by now. It is described in 
almost every recent corporate finance textbook, without, however, quoting Mayer in all cases. For instance, Brealey 
and Myers present extensive tables with net sources of financing on pp. 364-367 of the 5
th edition of their well-known 
textbook. With reference to the U.S., they write on p. 367: "The most striking aspect [of these tables] is the dominance 
of internally generated cash, defined as cash flow from operations less cash dividends paid to stockholders. Internally 
generated cash normally covers a majority of firm’s capital requirements." Page 324 of their 4
th edition contains the 
additional comment: "Notice that the reliance on internally generated cash is the same the whole world over." Similar 
textbook presentations of net sources of financing include Arnold (1998), p. 351, and Pike and Neale (1996), p. 465 
(both with special reference to the United Kingdom), Buckley et al. (1998) p. 354, Damodaran.(1997), p. 404 (with 
special reference to the G6-countries). Explicit references to Mayer in the research literature include Allen (1993), 
Allen and Gale (2000), Conti (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Hellwig (1991, 1997), and Thakor (1996).   5
Given that the "celebrated distinction" has a lot of theoretical as well as empirical arguments to 
corroborate it  - one of them being supported by data on levels (or stocks) of financing derived 
from the same very same database the MCJ flow-studies rely on (see Table II) - this is indeed a 
puzzle which needs to be solved. If one wished to reconcile the findings of Mayer and 
Corbett/Jenkinson (henceforth MCJ) with what others have postulated or would still feel inclined 
to believe, one should investigate whether their measurement method is appropriate; and this is 
what we wish to do now. So the natural question arises: which factors determine the MCJ results?    
Table II: Composition of non-financial companies’ inter-sectoral liabilities in four countries
7 
Balance Sheet Items  Germany  Japan  Great Britain  United States 
                                                                     % of total inter-sectoral liabilities at market prices (1971-1996) 
Bank Loans  49,5  56,8  14,3  15,3 
Securities (including equity)  18,8  42,5  65,2  72,2 
Others  31,7  0,7  20,5  12,5 
Source: National Account statistics and own calculations 
 
B   How can the Mayer et al. results be explained? 
In order to identify what we consider to be the main factor behind the MCJ results, we present a 
simple model of a stylized economy. There are three firms (or industries) A, B, and  C in the 
economy which undertake investments in real assets. In each period, only one of the three firms 
invests. Every investment is financed in the same way, namely 30% with internal funds and 70% 
with bank loans. We believe that it conforms to a common understanding of a financing pattern to 
say that this 30 to 70 relationship is "the financing pattern" of investment in this economy, and that 
the 30 to 70 percent relationship also provides the answer to the question quoted above, with 
which Corbett and Jenkinson start their paper. The economy runs over 9 periods,  t = -3 to 5. 
Physical investment is 50 in the first three periods, then goes up to 95 and subsequently declines 
and rises again, as is shown by the dotted line in Figure 1 and by the first row in Table III. Thus, 
there are business cycles in t his economy. The second row in Table III and the bars above the 
horizontal axis in Figure 1 - which are 35 for the first three periods - and the second row in Table 
III show the amount of external financing by banks to the one firm that is investing in the 
                                                             
7 Level data are characterized by one major disadvantage relative to flow data. The figures for securitized items are in 
most cases reported at market prices, so that they are not only influenced by the assumption and the redemption of 
obligations in the past periods but also by price changes which are not connected to the ways in which investment is 
financed. However, like aggregated balance sheet data they still provide us with a crude impression of the roles 
various instruments play in the financing of companies in different countries.   6
respective period (distinguished by different shadings). These financing figures are gross financing 
flows in the sense of not having been subjected to "repayment netting". 
Figure 1: Model economy with three firms 
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Table III: Financing patterns in the model economy 
Period  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5  0 to 5 
1. Physical Investment  50  50  50  75  95  90  70  50  60  440 
2. Gross Loan Financing*  35  35  35  53  67  63  49  35  42  308 
3. Gross Loan Repayments**  0  12  23  35  41  51  61  60  49  296 
4. Net Loan Financing   35  23  12  18  26  12  -12  -25  -7  12 
5. Loan Levels  35  58  70  88  113  125  113  89  82   
6. Internal Funds***  15  27  38  58  69  78  82  75  67  428 
        Periods 0 to 2  Periods 3 to 5   
7. Net Loan Financing/Physical Investment        21%  -24%  3% 
8. Internal Funds/Physical Investment        79%  124%  97% 
*   70% of physical investment  ** maturity of three years, constant repayment amounts 
***  must by definition equal 30% of physical investment plus loan repayments   7
But loans have to be repaid. For our model economy, we assume that they are repaid in equal 
installments in M periods after they have been taken out. Let M be 3. Figure 1 shows the (gross) 
repayment flows as bars below the horizontal axis - again with different shadings for the three 
firms (also see row 3 in Table III). For instance, in period -1, a third of the loan taken out by firm 
A in period -3 and a third of the loan of firm B from period -2 are repaid. Total gross repayment is 
(rounded to) 23. As firm C invests and borrows in period -1, the net external or bank financing in 
that period is only 12. This is shown by the bold line (and row 4. in Table III). In the following 
periods investment and thus also financing go up, while the smaller loans from earlier periods are 
repaid. Therefore net financing goes up and later on declines when investment declines cyclically. 
In the "recession periods" 3 to 5 net financing even becomes negative - and all this in spite of the 
fact that, consistently, 70% of all investments are financed externally by banks. 
The simple  model captures the essence of what MCJ use as the measure of " the relative 
significance of different sources of finance in physical investment" (Mayer and Alexander (1990), 
p. 454). The essential point in the MCJ measurement concept is that the financing from each of the 
individual sources of funds j is on a net basis in the sense of "repayment netting" explained above 
and as illustrated with our model.
8 In the last two rows of Table III the MCJ concept and their 
formula are applied to two three-year intervals and to the entire period covering t = 0 to t = 5 in 
our example. As one would already expect from comparing the dotted line and the bold line, 
internal financing dominates clearly even in the phase of expansion. For the entire period bank 
financing seems to be completely irrelevant, although it has been consistently assumed that banks 
finance 70 percent of all investments. Thus, it seems fair to say that this method of determining 
"how investment is financed" leads to a distorted picture of the reality which it aspires to capture, 
and that it might even suggest far-reaching, but misleading implications. Imagine that, based on 
the results for the model economy, someone would conclude that there was no reason to have 
banks at all! This does, however, not imply that there would not be important questions to which 
the MCJ measurement based on (double) netting does present important insights. It does indeed 
show the relative net contributions of different sources of finance over a given time interval.  
The factor which produce the MCJ results is the implicit assumption concerning how funds 
from each particular source are used: It is assumed that funds from bank loans are used in the first 
instance to pay back bank loans, while proceeds from the issue of new bonds or shares are first of 
                                                             
8 Note that there is no room for “balance sheet netting” in our model economy as firms do not deposit any funds with 
banks.   8
all used to redeem or buy back bonds and shares, respectively - and this on a sector-wide level. 
Only what remains after these "primary" uses of funds is assumed to finance investment. The case 
of internal financing is the only one in which there is no corresponding "use of first resort", and 
this creates the impression that investment is almost exclusively financed internally.
9 Only if this 
allocation of sources to uses of funds is avoided can one arrive at a realistic picture of  how 
investment is financed: All sources of funds are jointly employed for all uses of funds, and thus all 
sources of funds jointly provide the funding of investment. This is why it may be misleading to 
look at net financing instead of gross financing, and  even more so to derive implications 
concerning the various financial systems from the measurement results, and why it may be 
worthwhile to try out a method of measuring the financing of investment on the basis of gross 
financial flows, which we want to do in the next section.   
II  A new approach to the measurement of financing patterns 
A  The general idea - gross flows 
This section develops a new approach to measuring financing patterns. The aim is to arrive at a 
reliable picture of how the investments of firms are financed. As the example presented in the 
preceding section shows, the gross flows, the bank-financed part of which are indicated by the 
bars above the horizontal axis in Figure 1 and line 2 of Table III, provide the correct answer to the 
question of how investment is financed. However, the official flow-of-funds data only provide two 
sets of data, namely stocks of claims (or loan levels shown in line 5 of Table III) and net flows-of-
funds per period (corresponding to line 4), between sectors. The problem is, therefore, to find a 
way to reconstruct gross flows. The general idea behind the method of reconstruction proposed 
here is that - in the case of debt instruments - the gross flows are given by the sum of the net flows 
of any given period plus the repayments in that period for debt taken out in earlier periods. 
B  The conversion from net to gross flows 
In reality financial contracts differ with respect to their terms to maturity and their repayment 
patterns. In order to reconstruct gross flows, we need to make two simplifying assumptions. One is 
that financial instruments of any given type have a "standard" maturity, which is the estimated 
average maturity for instruments of that type in a given economy; the other is that repayment is 
                                                             
9 It is interesting to note that Jensen’s (1986) theory of free cash flow also postulates a specific use of internally 
generated funds for specific sources. But Jensen’s explicit assignment of funds is exactly the opposite of that implic-
itly assumed by the double netting procedure employed by net flow-of-funds studies.   9
always in equal installments. Both assumptions are  because of the unavailability of precise data, 
i.e. information on the attributes of every single loan taken out by any company in each of the 
three countries covered in our empirical study. 
Consider a class of loans with a term to maturity of  M years. Denote the cash  inflow from 
taking out new loans in period t by CI(t), the cash outflow for repaying old loans in period t by 
CO(t) and the resulting net cash flow by CN(t). By definition, CI(t) - which is the figure we are 
seeking - is given by the following equation: 
(1)  CI(t) = CN(t) + CO(t) 
By construction, that is by applying the two simplifying assumptions from above, 
(2)  CO(t) = CI(t-1)/M + CI(t-2)/M + …+ CI(t-M)/M 
must also hold. Now let S(t) denote the accumulated stock of loans of type j at the end of period t. 
A third assumption then allows us to reconstruct CI(t*) from S(t*) and CN(t*) for a chosen base 
year t*: We assume that the (gross) volumes of new loans CI* taken out in the M periods t*-1, t*-
2, ... ,  t*-M prior to the base year t* are identical: CI(t*-1) = CI(t*-2) =…= CI(t*-M). It follows 
from our assumptions that  CI* = CO(t*); the loan repayment in the base period equals the 
standard size of the gross loans of the M preceding periods. But as neither CI* nor CO(t*) are 
observable or provided by the data base, it is important that their value can be deduced from the 
observable values of the stock S(t*) and the net flow CN(t*) in the base period. As can be easily 
verified, CI* must then be given by 
(3)  CI* = 2[S(t*)-CN(t*)]/(M+1). 
Inserting  CI*, and thus also CO(t*), from equation (3) into equation (2), we can then use 
equation (1) to compute  CI(t*). Now that  CI(t*) is known, equation (2) can be solved for 
CO(t*+1), which in turn will yield  CI(t*+1) through equation (1). As becomes obvious, all the 
cash inflows for the subsequent years can be computed by "rolling forward" equations (1) and (2). 
In summary, all that we need in order to reconstruct gross flows for debt instruments is an estimate 
of the average  maturity  M of all instruments that fall into a given class  j and assumptions 
concerning the typical repayment schedule. 
In Table IV we have applied the concept to the model economy from the previous section 
assuming that the only data at hand are figures for bank loan levels and bank loan net financing for 
the years t* to t*+5. We chose t* as the base year and then applied equations (3), (2) and (1) from 
above consecutively to arrive at an estimate for the amount of gross bank financing in t*: Based on   10
the assumption that bank financing has been constant during the three periods prior to the base 
year and that the average maturity of loans taken out was three years, CI* must equal 35 in order 
to yield an amount of loans outstanding of 88 units in t*. 
Table IV: Reconstruction of gross flows based on level and net flow figures (M=3) 
Period  t*-3  t*-2  t*-1  t*  t*+1  t*+2  t*+3  t*+4  t*+5  t* to 
t*+5 
Physical Investment        75  95  90  70  50  60  440 
Loan Levels S(t)        88  113  125  113  89  82   
Net Loan Financing CN(t)         18  26  12  -12  -25  -7   
                     
Gross Loan Financing CI(t)  35  35  35  53  67  63  49  35  42  308 
Gross Loan Repayments CO(t)        35  41  51  61  60  49   
        Periods t* to t*+2  Periods t*+3 to t*+5   
Net Loan Financing/Physical Investment        70%  70%  70% 
Equation (2) leads to CO(t*)=CI* and given a net flow of loans of 18 units the sought after 
figure for CI(t*) must equal 53 units. Reapplying equation (2) to the loans taken out in periods t*-
2 to  t* we arrived at CO(t*+1)=41 and adding CN(t*+1) as set down in equation (1) we obtained 
CI(t*+1). The last two steps were then sequentially reapplied for all subsequent periods until t*+5. 
As can be easily verified by comparing Tables IV and III, the reconstructed gross flows are 
identical with the actual gross flows from the example. Consequently, the ratio of reconstructed 
gross flows to physical investments amounts to 70% and thereby indicates what we consider to be 
the true significance of bank finance in the model economy. 
 
C  The reconstruction of gross flows: An example 
Whether the information necessary for estimating CIj(t*) from the outstanding stock Sj(t*), the 
net flow CNj(t*), and the term to maturity Mj is available, or can at least be estimated with a suf-
ficient degree of accuracy, is an empirical question. As can be seen from equation (3), estimation 
errors with respect to the unknown parameter M matter less the greater the lower bound for the 
estimate. The lower bound itself can be derived from official statistics. 
Take the case of long-term bank loan financing of German firms. In its monthly reports, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank reports how the total volume of bank loans to businesses outstanding at the 
end of a given year divides up into loans with an original maturity of between one and four years, 
and into those with an original maturity of more than four years. During the years between 1990 
Equation (3) 
Equation (1) 
Equation (2) 
CI*   11
and 1996, only 14% fell into the first category, whereas the majority fell into the second cate-
gory.
10 Even when allowing for extreme distributions of maturities within the two categories it 
seems safe to conclude that four years marks the lower bound for any estimate of  Mj; with  j 
denoting "long-term bank loans to German enterprises". If we assume the maturities to be more 
uniformly distributed, an estimated average value for Mj of six years seems more appropriate. 
Applying this estimate to the German data on long-term bank loans leads to the empirical 
result presented in Table IV and Appendix 1, namely that 73% (1970-1996) of gross investment 
has been "financed with" long-term bank loans.
11 This should not be misinterpreted as saying that 
these long term loans were "really" used to pay for capital goods etc., as of course this would also 
imply an inappropriate attribution or allocation of one source of funds to one specific use of funds. 
The long-term loans were used to contribute, together with all other sources of medium to long-
term funds, to the totality of all medium to long-term uses of funds. 
Generalizing the method explained for the case of long-term bank financing in Germany, one 
can collect data for the terms to maturity and the amounts of stocks and net flows for various 
classes of financial instruments for different countries and estimate the gross flows by applying 
the procedure described above and summarized in equations (1) to (3).   
 
III  Measuring financial patterns in three large economies 
A  Data and assumptions 
The data sources which have been used for measuring the gross flows as indicators of financial 
patterns in Germany, Japan and the United States are the official statistics of the respective 
authorities.
12 Gross figures on equity financing are taken from various stock exchange 
publications. The following two important assumptions were made. First, we followed the practice 
of MCJ in assuming that short-term financing is indeed used for short-term investment only. In 
this special case their assumption seems to be more appropriate than it is as a general assumption; 
in addition, including short-term financial instruments would make interpretation in terms of the 
                                                             
10 Interestingly, the distribution of loans between the two classes has not varied strongly over time: The portions for 
loans in the second category in the four 5-year periods between 1970 and 1989 have been 78%, 84%, 84%, and 87%, 
respectively. 
11 A simple sensitivity analysis applied to the estimate of the maturities yields the following result. If we assume the 
average maturity of German bank loans to be 4 (8) years instead of 6, the empirical estimate of .73 reported in the last 
column of Table VI below would have to be replaced by .93 (.65), which would leave the qualitative result unaffected.  
12 In the case of Germany, they are from the Gesamtwirtschaftliche Finanzierungsrechnung of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, in the case of Japan they have been obtained from the Japanese National Accounts compiled by the Bank of 
Japan, and for the U.S. the data are from the Federal Reserve System’s Flow of Funds Accounts.   12
gross flows extremely difficult because the short-term flows would appear to have an inappropri-
ately large influence on total financing.
13 Thus we restricted the following calculations to financ-
ing instruments for which the time to maturity i s at least one year, and called this long-term 
financing for the sake of brevity. The second important assumption is that all fixed income 
financial instruments are repaid in equal installments over their estimated maturities. The first 
columns in Appendices 1-3 show our estimates (in years to maturity) for the various instruments 
considered in the three countries. Columns 3 and 5 list average figures (1970-1996) for all gross 
financial flows, i.e. sources and uses of funds, including short-term instruments.
14 
 
B  Empirical results 
One of the most prominent results of the studies by Mayer and Corbett and Jenkinson is that 
internal financing is by far the most important source of financing in all countries which these 
authors analyzed. Only in Japan is the share of internal financing less pronounced, which Sussman 
(1994) explains by observing that due to the phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy during 
the past two decades, internal funds may simply not have been sufficient to finance all investments 
which have been undertaken. 
The upper panel of Table V shows the results concerning the importance of external financing 
in the three countries for the time span between 1970 and 1996 (the respective figures for internal 
funds are shown in Table VI below, together with the gross contribution of individual sources of 
external funds). By applying equations (1) to (3) and choosing 1960 as the base year t* for all 
three countries we estimated the values of all sources of inter-sectoral long-term financing, added 
them  up and expressed them as a percentage of total physical investment. By construction, and 
therefore in contrast to Corbett and Jenkinson, these figures are gross figures and thus exceed 
100%. The numbers in the lower panel were derived similarly, except that only those gross flows 
entered the nominator that involved securitized instruments like bonds and stocks. 
 
                                                             
13 Setting Mj=1 in our method is equivalent to the assumption that the total volume Sj(t-1) outstanding at the end of 
period t-1 has been fully repaid in t and that all of Sj(t) has been a cash inflow during the same period. Even if the 
resulting gross figures were good estimates for the true flows, they do not help us very much in answering the initial 
question "How is (long-term) investment financed?" but rather characterize the liquidity management of the enterprise 
sectors analyzed. For the sake of completeness, we have included the reconstructed gross flows relating to short-term 
instruments in appendices 1 to 3. 
14 More detailed information on the data base is contained in xxx (references will be supplemented later in order not to 
identify the authors of the present paper).   13
Table V: The importance of external funds and securities 
External Funds  70-74  75-79  80-84  85-89  90-96  70-96 
new long-term external funds / physical investment (in %) 
Germany
  81  93  95  97  95  93 
USA
  137  137  141  182  189  163 
Japan  114  169  169  189  203  176 
Securitized Funds             
new long-term securities issued / physical investment (in %) 
Germany  12  9  8  11  13  12 
USA  42  42  41  45  48  45 
Japan  10  10  10  15  16  13 
 
Disregarding all details, Table V provides a completely different picture from that of the 
Corbett and Jenkinson study reproduced in Table I. Most important, we arrive at different 
indicators for the relative importance of external and internal funding: There are indeed significant 
differences between the three financial systems which the new measurement method brings out 
clearly. The latter point is underscored by the results in the lower panel. With a surprising 
consistency over time, the share of securities, or capital markets, as a source of financing is 
obviously very different between the three countries. It is completely in line with generally held 
expectations that capital markets are a much more important source of financing in the U.S. than 
in Germany and Japan. Even though securitized financing is not necessarily financing by providers 
of funds other than financial intermediaries and in particular other than banks
15, this result 
supports the view that the three financial systems differ greatly and in a predictable way. 
Table VI offers a closer look at the composition or patterns of external financing for the three 
countries in a way which is directly comparable to the Corbett and Jenkinson results, i.e. as a 
percentage of physical investment. Apart from minor details the first line concerning internal 
finance corresponds to their figures. Table VII offers a complementary view on the very same 
financing patterns by a slight alteration of the observation angle. It presents the composition of 
gross external financing according to the sectors which provide funds to the sector of non-financial 
companies and thus replaces the instrumental perspective from above by an institutional 
perspective. In keeping with the standard sector classification o f flow-of-funds statistics, five 
                                                             
15 For a recent discussion of this point, see Schmidt, Hackethal and Tyrell (1999).   14
sectors are distinguished, with the rest of the world (RoW) and government lumped together.
16 
Table VI: Patterns of external gross financing by instrument 
Instruments  70-74  75-79  80-84  85-89  90-96  70-96 
       USA (% of physical investment)   
Internal finance  71  82  83  93  103  89 
Bank loans  64  61  64  75  62  65 
NBFI loans  15  19  19  26  36  25 
Bonds  39  38  37  55  62  49 
Commercial paper  4  4  7  11  15  9 
New equity  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  15* 
       Germany (% of physical investment)   
Internal finance  77  96  94  98  83  88 
Bank loans  62  74  76  76  75  73 
Loans from insurance companies  10  11  10  10  8  9 
Bonds  7  5  5  7  8  7 
New equity  3  3  3  4  5  3 
       Japan (% of physical investment)   
Internal finance  50  72  71  76  75  70 
Bank loans  102  152  152  161  172  152 
  from public financial institutions  9  16  16  20  29  20 
Bonds  8  14  12  12  20  14 
Commercial paper  0  0  0  9  11  6 
New equity  4  4  4  7  2  4 
* The available data permitted us to report a figure for the average cash inflow through equity issues for the period 1988-1995 only. 
For the same reason, no figures for the equity financing of the non-corporate businesses can be shown. Crude estimates on the basis 
of levels outstanding range from around 20% in the early 1970s to approximately 10% in the mid-1990s. 
The Banks and the non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFI) are distinguished as two sub-
sectors of the financial sector in order to point out interesting differences and developments. Note 
that in this table, the figures are percentages of total external long-term funding and thus add up to 
100. Presenting the sectoral breakdown as percentages of total investment, as in the tables above, 
would not alter the conclusions, but make them less obvious. As one can easily see from Tables V 
to VII, the patterns of external financing differ very much between the U.S. on the one side and 
Germany and Japan on the other. In the case of bank finance, the difference is most pronounced. 
Bank loans have been the dominant source of external finance for both German and Japanese 
                                                             
16 Whereas in the case of the instrument "bank loans" it is clear to which sector the creditor belongs, in the case of 
some other instruments, notably shares, bonds, and commercial paper, the National Accounts do not name the claim-
holders’ sector explicitly. Thus, for deriving Table VII, we had to make another simplifying assumption, namely that 
investors map the market in their portfolios. Let households hold shares worth 200 units in a given year and let total 
market capitalization be split in 60% issued by non-financial companies, 30% issued by banks, and 10% issued by 
NBFI. We assume that households hold non-financial companies shares worth 120, bank shares worth 60 and NBFI-
shares worth 20 units and thus follow the proposition of the standard CAPM.   15
companies, whereas they only made up for about a third of American companies' external 
financing needs in the early 1990s. 
Table VII: Composition of external gross financing by sector 
Sectors  70-74  75-79  80-84  85-89  90-96  70-96 
       USA (% of total long-term external finance)   
Banks  51  49  49  46  36  44 
NBFI  36  39  40  41  49  42 
Households  12  11  7  7  9  9 
RoW/Government  1  2  4  6  6  4 
       Germany (% of total long-term external finance)   
Banks  80  82  84  82  83  82 
NBFI  14  14  12  13  11  12 
Households  4  3  3  4  4  4 
RoW/Government  2  1  1  2  3  2 
       Japan (% of total long-term external finance)   
Banks  95  95  95  91  92  93 
  of which: public financial institutions  8  10  10  12  17  13 
NBFI  2  2  3  6  6  5 
Households  2  2  2  2  1  2 
RoW/Government  1  0  1  0  1  1 
Assuming, as one can do with only some slight reservations, that NBFI financing mainly takes 
the form of buying and holding instruments with active secondary markets, one also recognizes a 
marked difference between the relative weights of capital market financing via NBFIs not only 
between the three countries, but in the case of the United States also over time. In the U.S. the 
most important group of NBFIs are pension funds and mutual funds which mainly invest in 
securities. Thus capital markets- or NBFI-financing appears to have changed places with bank 
financing in the course of the last 25 years. During the same period, NBFI-financing in Germany 
and Japan consisting primarily of funds from insurance companies which do  not  invest in 
securities to a great extent, has only moderately increased in Japan and has even slightly decreased 
in Germany. Contrary to MCJ's double-netting approach, our gross approach thus yields results 
that indicate country-specific trends in financing patterns: Whereas American companies clearly 
emancipate themselves from bank financing and thus from the reliance on one particular sector, 
both German and Japanese companies seem to remain heavily dependent on their banking sectors. 
Hence, we can observe a profound or structural divergence of national financing patterns. This 
completes our presentation of results.   
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IV  Financial systems do differ  
The comparisons of stocks of inter-sectoral financial claims and of gross flows of funds 
between sectors show that the financing patterns in the three large economies discussed in this 
paper differ substantially. This suggests that it makes sense to speak of different national financing 
patterns. The "celebrated distinction between the market-based financial patterns of ... the United 
States and of the bank-based patterns of Germany" is  not inaccurate, as Corbett and Jenkinson 
seem to believe on the basis of their measurement procedure. To conclude the paper, we briefly 
analyze whether this result can be generalized in such a way that it also makes sense to speak of 
types of national financial systems and to distinguish between financial systems of specific 
countries accordingly. Our answer will be sketched out in two steps.  
One would expect the financing patterns in a given country to be a reflection of the corporate 
governance system of that country. National corporate governance systems differ considerably. 
Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular the United States, have corporate governance systems in 
which the market for corporate control used to play a key role at least in the recent past. Their 
main corporate governance problem is seen as being that of making managers act in the interests 
of shareholders. Maximizing shareholder value is not merely the paramount objective of 
corporations, it is also the only legitimate objective. Thus, capital markets are very important for 
corporate governance. The relationship between Anglo-Saxon banks as lenders and firms as 
borrowers is typically at arm’s length, and banks are not even allowed to play an active role in the 
governance of the corporations to which they lend. Finally, in Anglo-Saxon corporations there is 
no place for anything which would resemble codetermination. Like those of shareholders and 
lenders, the interests of employees are typically secured by giving them outside  - or exit  - 
opportunities rather than by creating internal structures through which their voices can be heard. 
To use the term coined by Franks and Mayer (1995), the entire systems are "outsider-controlled". 
Although they differ from one another in several important respects, both the German and the 
Japanese corporate governance systems are based on principles that are diametrically opposed to 
those of the Anglo-Saxon outsider-controlled systems. Active takeover markets hardly exist. It is 
more than questionable that management’s main task  - let alone its only task  - should be to 
maximize the share price. Not only do most managers see themselves as having a commitment to 
serve the interests of several groups of stakeholders, but the legal system also obliges them to do   17
so.
17 Thus the capital market has a limited role to play in disciplining and guiding management. 
Banks as lenders are closer to their borrower-clients, and they are also heavily involved in the 
internal mechanisms of corporate governance - when things are going well for the respective firm 
and even more so when it gets into trouble. Both systems feature mechanisms whereby persons 
who represent the interests of employees - or of certain core groups of employees - are able to 
directly influence the governance of corporations, be it in the framework of legally mandatory 
codetermination as in Germany, or merely as a result of established practice and implicit labor 
contracts as in Japan. All in all, the two corporate governance systems are, to use the terminology 
of Franks and Mayer (1995), "insider-controlled".  
It would be more than strange if there were widely different corporate governance systems on 
the one side and basically identical financing patterns on the other. The new method of measuring 
financial patterns presented and applied in this paper leads to empirical results which are in line 
with what one would expect on the basis of the respective corporate governance systems: Capital 
markets and banks are either important or unimportant, respectively, as a source of funding and at 
the same time as an element of corporate governance. Thus the puzzle presented by the findings of 
Mayer and those who followed his line of research seems to be solved. 
We now come to the second step.
18 A financial system consists of at least four elements or 
subsystems. Two of these, namely financing patterns and corporate governance systems, have 
already been discussed. Evidently, another element or subsystem of the financial system of a 
country is its financial sector, which is itself composed of financial markets and institutions and 
exhibits certain structural features. The fourth element or subsystem is the predominant business 
system, which is characterized by corporate structures and strategies and thus also by the 
prevailing methods and processes of making adjustments to changing circumstances in the 
environment in which firms operate. 
As the colloquial use of the term "system" suggests, a system is more than a collection of 
elements. It is composed of  complementary  elements. Elements are complementary if they 
mutually increase the "benefits" they yield in terms of whatever the objective function or the 
standard for evaluating the system may be, and mutually reduce their disadvantages or "costs". A 
                                                             
17 Interesting empirical evidence on the importance which managers in different countries attach to various constitu-
encies is reported in the first chapter of Allen and Gale (2000). For an economic and legal analysis of the shareholder-
value rule in the case of Germany, see xxx (see note 14) . 
18 The following argument is based on the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1995) and transfers their concept of business 
systems to financial systems.    18
system is coherent if its complementary elements take on values which make the system attain a 
local optimum, i.e. if the elements or subsystems "fit together". Systems of complementary 
elements typically have more than one optimum, and the local optima are clearly distinct 
configurations of the values of the elements. 
Financial systems can be regarded as systems in this specific sense.
19 The complementarity of 
their core elements or subsystems and the economic benefits which a coherent financial system 
can be assumed to produce are the factors which account for the tendency of the financial systems 
of successful economies to be also consistent. Coherent financial systems are of two types: One 
type is characterized by a financial sector in which banks are the dominant element of the financial 
sector, firms are to a large extent financed by banks, corporate governance is "insider controlled", 
and the prevailing business system is one with much firm-specific human capital, many implicit 
contracts and a tendency towards gradual change. The other type is characterized by the opposing 
set of values for the four elements or subsystems: capital markets are a more important element of 
the financial sector than banks, there is less bank financing of firms, corporate governance is 
"outsider-controlled", and corporations are highly flexible, being able to undertake strategic 
adjustments with "big leaps".
20  
If one could establish that the actual financial systems of specific countries were indeed 
coherent systems, this would have far-reaching implications. It would suggest how the financial 
and the non-financial sectors of different countries interact and it would help to answer the 
important question whether financial systems tend to converge or not.
21  
The financial systems of the United States and Great Britain and of Germany and Japan largely 
conform to the theoretical distinction between the two types of financial systems. At least the 
composition and structures of the financial sectors, the corporate governance systems a nd the 
business systems appear to be consistent. However, if one were to take the empirical results found 
by Mayer and Corbett and Jenkinson at face value there would seem to be a missing link: The 
financing patterns of corporations would not fit the picture, and this would call into question the 
validity of the entire concept of a financial system as a coherent set of complementary elements. 
                                                             
19 For details, see xxx (see note 14 above). 
20 The link between relationship lending, insider-oriented governance and firm-specific human capital is analyzed in 
greater depth by Hackethal and Tyrell (1998) and Berkovitch and Israel (1998). The correspondence between financial 
patterns and business systems is also discussed by Aoki (1999).  
21 See the papers by Bebchuk and Roe (2000) on the convergence of corporate governance systems. The arguments in 
this paper can be readily generalized to the issue of the convergence of entire financial systems.    19
Given that it is important to have a concept to describe financial systems, to analyze them and to 
make predictions about their development and their economic consequences, it is relevant that the 
new method of measuring financial patterns presented in this paper leads to empirical results 
which suggest that the financing patterns are indeed consistent with the other elements of the 
respective financial systems.   20
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Appendix 1: Sources and uses of finance of German enterprises (1970-1996) as a portion 
 of physical investment 
M
(1)  Sources  (%)  Uses  (%)  Net 
  Depreciation   72.2       
  Retained Earnings  3.2       
  Capital Transfers  8.3       
  Pension Provisions  4.7       
  Internal Finance  88.4 
1  Trade Credit (obtained)  32.3  Trade Credit (repaid)  -30.4  1.9 
1  Trade Credit (reimbursed)  49.2  Trade Credit (granted)  -52.2  -2.9 
  Net finance through trade credit  -1.0 
1  Short-term bank loans (obtained)  130.0  Short-term bank loans (repaid)  -121.1  8.8 
1  Short-term deposits (withdrawn)  142.8  Short-term deposits (invested)  -154.9  -12.1 
6  Long-term bank loans (obtained)  72.9  Long-term bank loans (repaid)  -55.9  17.0 
4  Long-term deposits (withdrawn)  5.9  Short-term deposits (invested)  -7.1  -1.2 
  Net finance from bank loans and deposits  12.5 
6  NBFI Loans (obtained)  9.3  NBFI Loans (repaid)  -7.6  1.7 
  Net finance from NBFIs  1.7 
7  Own Bonds (issued)  7.0  Own bonds (redeemed)  -5.1  1.9 
7  Other Bonds
(2) (sold, reimbursed)  5.4  Other Bonds (purchased)  -7.8  -2.4 
  Net finance through bonds  -0.5 
  Equity (issued)
(3)  3.8  Equity (bought back)  n.a  3.8 
  Stocks from other corps. (sold)    Stocks from other corps. (purchased)    -3.1 
  Net finance through stocks  0.7 
  Others (incl. rounding errors and statistical adjustments)  -0.1 
      Physical investment in fixed assets  -96.9   
      Changes in working capital  -3.1   
      Gross physical investment  -100 
For notes see Appendix 4. 
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Appendix 2: Sources and uses of finance of American enterprises (1970-1996) as a portion 
 of physical investment 
M
(1) Sources  (%)  Uses  (%)  Net 
  Depreciation  77.6       
  Retained Earnings  11.2       
  Internal Finance
(4)  88.8 
1  Trade Credit (obtained)  12.3  Trade Credit (repaid)  -13.4  1.2 
1  Trade Credit (reimbursed)  32.6  Trade Credit (granted)  -35.4  -2.8 
  Net finance through trade credit  -1.6 
1  Short-term bank loans (obtained)  48.5  Short-term bank loans (repaid)  -46.7  1.8 
1  Short-term deposits (withdrawn)  29.2  Short-term deposits (invested)  -31.1  -1.8 
6  Long-term bank loans (obtained)  65.4  Long-term bank loans (repaid)  -52.4  13.0 
4  Long-term deposits (withdrawn)  14.6  Short-term deposits (invested)  -16.5  -1.8 
  Net finance from bank loans and deposits  11.2 
6  NBFI-loans (obtained)  24.6  NBFI-loans (repaid)  -19.6  5.0 
4  Loans to households (reimbursed)  8.0  Loans to households (granted)  -9.5  -1.4 
Net finance from NBFIs and households  3.6 
2  Own commercial paper (issued)  9.2  Own commercial paper (repaid)  -7.9  1.3 
2  Other CP (sold, reimbursed)  2.4  Other CP (purchased)  -2.7  -0.2 
    Net finance through commercial paper  1.1 
7  Own Bonds (issued)  48.5  Own bonds (redeemed)  -35.9  12.6 
7  Other Bonds
(2) (sold, reimbursed)  3.1  Other bonds (purchased)  -4.2  -1.1 
  Net finance through bonds  11.5 
  Equity (issued)
(6)  14.9  Equity (bought back)  -22.9  -8.0 
  Equity of non-corp. Bus. (issued)  >10  Equity of non-corp. bus. (bought back)  <-10  0.8 
  Net finance through equity  -7.2 
  Net finance through foreign direct investment  -2.5 
  Others (incl. rounding errors and statistical adjustments)  -4.9 
      Physical investment in fixed assets  -95.5   
      Changes in working capital  -4.5   
      Gross physical investment  -100 
For notes see Appendix 4.   25
Appendix 3: Sources and uses of finance of Japanese enterprises (1970-1996) as a portion 
 of physical investment 
M
(1)  Sources  (%)  Uses  (%)  Net 
  Depreciation  49.5       
  Retained Earnings  20.5       
  Internal finance  70.0 
1  Trade Credit (obtained)  21.1  Trade Credit (repaid)  -20.3  0.8 
1  Trade Credit (reimbursed)  27.1  Trade Credit (granted)  -28.0  -0.9 
  Net finance through Trade Credit  -0.1 
  Short-term loans
(7) (obtained)    Short-term loans (repaid))     
1  …from private banks  266.0  …to private banks  -250.9  15.0 
1  …from public financial institutions  37.2  …to public financial institutions  -34.4  2.8 
1  Short-term deposits (withdrawn)  105.1  Short-term deposits (invested)  -112.7  -7.6 
  Long-term Loans (obtained)    Long-term Loans (repaid)     
7  …from private banks  132.1  …to private banks  -99.0  33.1 
7  …from public financial institutions  20.2  …to public financial institutions  -13.6  6.6 
4  Long-term deposits (withdrawn)  74.3  Long-term deposits (invested)  -86.7  -12.4 
  Net finance from bank loans and deposits  37.5 
2  Own commercial paper (issued)  5.7  Own commercial paper (repaid)  -4.8  0.9 
2  Other CP (sold, reimbursed)  1.4  Other CP (purchased)  -1.6  -0.2 
    Net finance through Commercial Paper  0.7 
7  Own Bonds (issued)  14.3  Own bonds (redeemed)  -9.6  4.7 
7  Other Bonds
(2) (sold, reimbursed)  4.7  Other Bonds (purchased)  -6.2  -1.5 
  Net finance through bonds  3.2 
  Equity (issued)
(6)  3.8  Equity (bought back)  n.a.  3.8 
  Stocks from other corps. (sold)    Stocks from other corps. (purchased)    -0.2 
  Net finance through equity  3.6 
  Net finance from trusts  -6.9 
  Net finance from Rest of World  -8.2 
  Others (incl. rounding errors and statistical adjustments)  0.2 
      Physical investment in fixed assets  -84.8   
      Changes in working capital  -15.2   
      Gross physical investment  -100 
For notes see Appendix 4. 
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Appendix 4: Notes to Appendices 1 to 3 
 
(1)  Estimated average term to maturity of respective instrument. 
(2)  This entry also includes bills and commercial paper, whose average portion, however, does not exceed 10%. 
(3)  Of course, flows for new equity cannot be estimated using the same methodology as for fixed income instruments 
as there are no contracted redemption repayments. We thus had to assume that the flow figures from the National 
accounts are equal to the total volume of new issues. This simplifying assumption seems warranted for Germany, 
as buybacks of own equity hardly ever occur. In another publication, the Bundesbank reports the actual volume of 
newly issued equity for all domestic corporations, that is including financial companies. Based on these data, new 
equity would account for 5.0% of the gross total of all sources. This figure represents the upper bound for the new 
equity entry in appendix 1.  
  Equity issues of non-corporate enterprises are included in internal funds. However, according to the Bundesbank 
(monthly report Oct. 1998, p. 36) this source of finance only amounts to 1.5% of physical investment in 1997. 
(4)  The discrepancy between this figure and the corresponding figure (96.1%) in Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) is 
primarily due to the inclusion of the farm sector. 
(5)  Short-term loans are not explicitly reported in the U.S. data. The 1983 (20%) and 1993 (17%) figures for their 
share of total loans were taken from Borio (1995). We assume here that prior to 1983 and after 1993 the portion 
remained constant at 20% and 17% respectively. For the intervening ten years we used linear extrapolation. 
(6)   It is much more common for U.S. corporations to buy back their own shares than it is for their German and 
Japanese counterparts. Only since 1995 has it been it legally possible for Japanese corporations to do so. Whereas 
net flows of funds are only slightly smaller than gross flows in these two countries and could thus be used as lower 
bounds on our estimates, we had to take data from stock exchange publications to approximate gross flows for the 
U.S. corporations. For this purpose we had to adjust the data to allow for equity issued by financial institutions. 
(7)  Short-term loans are not explicitly reported in the Japanese data. The 1983 (41%) and 1993 (32%) figures for their 
share of total loans were taken from Borio (1995). We assume that prior to 1983 and after 1993 the portion 
remained constant at 41% and 32% respectively. For the intervening ten years we used linear extrapolation. 
 